Suchergebnisse

In this work I aim to explain the theory of tyranny outlined by Alexandre Kojève in the essay entitled Tyrannie et Sagesse, that was originally composed as a review of Leo Strauss' On Ty-ranny. The paper tries to demonstrate that this specific Kojèvian theory is not occasional, but it repre-sents an important articulation of the "Hegelian" System of wisdom created by the Russian phi-losopher. An articulation in which it shows a kind of "meeting place" of central parts of the Sy-stem, in particular the philosophical anthropology based on desire (Begierde) and recognition (Anerkennung), the theory of Authority and the phenomenology of law. The common thread of my interpretation is the relationship thematised by Kojève between political power and philosophy. This perspective could open plural dimensions of tyranny in the kojèvian thought. Dimensions which are interconnected in the direction of a post-historical and post-political State, in which the concepts of "stranger" and "alien" are dissolved into an universal and all-embracing reality.

This work concerns Walter Benjamin's theory of state of exception in the context of his philosophy of history, which is expressed above all in two important essays: Über den Begriff der Geschichte ("On the concept of history", 1942) and Zur Kritik der Gewalt ("Critique of violence", 1921). This paper tries to outline the metaphysical meaning of the distinction that Benjamin made between "state of exception" (Ausnahmezustand) as a condition of political and juridical oppression and the real state of exception (wirklich Ausnahmezustand), which instead Benjamin described as the revolutionary chance of the oppressed classes that we can think exclusively because of a Messianic conception of time (Jetztzeit) and history (historical materialism theologically interpreted). Thanks to this reconstruction of Benjamin's philosophy of history, the paper attempts to show – also through a comparison with the theories of Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes and Lenin – whether it is possible to think of a philosophy of law as a philosophy against law.